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Abstract 
This study employs four dimensional (firm-product-destination-year) export data of 
Brazilian firms to empirically examine the effect of past exporting relationships of 
firms, whose products are targeted by antidumping duties, on their export flows to 
alternative markets. We show that, on the intensive margin, firms increase their 
export volumes to alternative countries in which they were already exporting the 
duty imposed product when they suffer an AD duty in a particular country. On the 
extensive margin, our findings suggest that firms’ probability of exporting a duty 
imposed product to a new market resulting from an AD duty in a different market 
increases only if they have already an established trading relationship in that market. 
In addition to making sense of existing puzzles in trade deflection,  this  paper  makes  an  
important  contribution  by  demonstrating  how  much  the  fixed costs  of  developing  
an  export  destination  matter in terms of trade deflection. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Antidumping (AD) has become a favorite remedy for the firms which seek 
protection. These preferences have increased especially after the substantial tariff 
liberalization countries have undergone after the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)’s rules and enforcements. Most tariffs are governed by trade agreements; 
however countries can impose temporary import restrictions by the use of 
alternative instruments. Among these instruments, AD has become the most 
frequently used and the most effective one.3  
Similar to other discriminatory adjustments in trade policy, AD duties not 
only affect the trade flows of the named and the duty imposing country but also 
affect the trade flows of the third party countries.4 This effect can occur in the form 
of trade diversion, a change in the source of origin for a country's imports caused 
by a change in importer’s trade policy, or in the form of trade deflection, a change 
in the destination of exports due to an increase in trade restriction in a particular 
export market. One of the more well-known pieces of evidence on trade diversion 
is from Prusa (2001) who shows that US imposition of an AD duty increases the 
imports from the countries which are not named in the investigation.  
The idea of trade deflection was first introduced by Bown and Crowley 
(henceforth BC) (2007). In their product-level analysis, they show that US 
imposition of import restrictions in the form of an AD duty resulted in Japanese 
exports surging to non-US countries. Their findings suggest that exporters which 
suffer discriminatory trade restrictions in a country strive to find alternative 
markets to sell their products. In contrast to their analysis based on Japan, BC 
                                                          
3 Antidumping duties, which are defined in GATT Article VI, are easier to use compared to other 
safeguards such as emergency protection of a threatened industry (GATT Article XIX), exceptions 
for health or safety concerns (GATT Article XX) and restrictions for national security (GATT Article 
XXI). 
4 A ‘discriminatory’ trade policy is the one in which a country imposes different trade restrictions 
to imports from different exporting countries. Two examples in this category are the preferential 
trade agreements and antidumping duties. On the contrary, a ‘nondiscriminatory’ trade policy is 
the one that is applied equally to all importers. 
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(2010) suggest no systematic evidence of trade deflection for Chinese products 
targeted by US AD duties. They also mention that the lack of trade deflection 
could be related to the fact that China is a “new” entrant to the global trading 
system and Chinese firms have not yet set up necessary networks to deflect trade 
to alternate markets.5  
However plausible their argument on the lack of trade deflection in China 
is, the product-level feature of their dataset does not allow them to explore the 
linkage between firms’ previous exporting status in different markets and trade 
deflection. It is highly likely that Japanese firms which were serving more markets 
compared to their Chinese counterparts could deflect their trade to alternative 
destinations. In addition, some Chinese firms might have deflected their 
shipments to some of their trading partners, which would be hidden when the 
exports are aggregated to product level. In the presence of sunk start-up costs of 
exporting, it is difficult for the exporters to sell their products in alternative 
markets if they have not setup ongoing trading relationships in multiple markets. 
This argument is impossible to analyze without breaking down the firm exports 
by exported products and export destinations.  
This study employs a unique four dimensional (firm-product-destination-
year) Brazilian firm-level export data to investigate the effect of sunk start-up costs 
of exporting on the trade flows of the firms to alternative markets when they 
suffer AD duties in a particular destination. Analyzing the firm-level responses of 
AD duties on trade deflection will provide a better understanding of which 
destinations are potential export markets and whether the past trading 
relationships matter to deflect trade for the firms whose products are targeted by 
AD measures. In this regard, our rich dataset provides a unique opportunity to 
explore the variation in exports within firms across different destinations when 
                                                          
5 China was granted membership in the WTO in 2001 and BC (2010) investigates the pre-accession 
period of China to WTO. 
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there is a change in trade barrier for a particular product in a particular export 
destination.     
To date, there is too few studies in the AD literature using firm-level data. 
Konings and Vandenbussche (henceforth KV) (2008) estimate the effect of 
antidumping protection on the productivity of domestic import-competing firms 
in the EU. Belderbos (1997) illustrates the relationship between EU and US 
antidumping measures and foreign direct investment through a micro-
econometrical analysis of Japanese firms’ plant establishments in the electronics 
industry. In a noticeably detailed analysis, Pierce (2011) investigates the plant-
level responses to AD measures for the protected plants in the US. Avsar (2012) 
examines the pricing effect of AD duties and the exporters’ response to a threat of 
retaliation stemming from domestic AD actions. KV (2010) remains the only firm-
level study of AD policy to analyze the value of export sales and the extensive 
margin of exports.  
Although related, our paper conceptually distinguishes from KV (2010) by 
the fact that their study focuses on the effect of France’s AD duties on the exports 
of the domestic protected firms, whereas this paper analyzes the effect of AD 
duties which targets the exporters in the international market. In addition, they 
exploit a three dimensional panel which does not differentiate the product 
categories for the firms which exports multiple products. Whereas, with a four 
dimensional panel data for firm, product and destinations, the empirical analysis 
carried out in this paper is a significant improvement over the previous studies 
which investigate the trading effects of AD measures.  
It should be highlighted that AD duties provide a useful way of examining 
trade deflection. Antidumping duties yield substantial changes in trade flows 
given the fact that they are on average 10 to 20 times higher than the most favored 
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nation (MFN) tariffs.6 Besides, AD duty is a product and a market specific trading 
cost for a firm. For example, if Mexican AD agencies impose an AD duty on 
Brazilian cotton shirt exporters, neither the other textile shirt exporters of Brazil 
nor the cotton shirt exporters of Argentina will be affected by this discriminatory 
policy adjustment. Hence, if a firm sells multiple products to a destination, it is 
obliged to pay AD duties only for the particular product which is targeted by the 
importer country. Since our analysis is based on the attractive source of variation 
in the value of exports within firm-product combinations across export 
destinations, these product specific shocks for the firms in different export markets 
perfectly fits with our research question.  
Alongside this, Brazil is a well-suited country for such an analysis for 
number of reasons. First, highly disaggregated firm-level data of Brazilian exports 
makes Brazil an outstanding case for this research. Second, Brazilian exported 
products were frequently targeted by AD duty over the period of our sample. 
There are 51 AD cases filed against Brazil in this period, 40 of which resulted ‘n 
rulings against Brazil. Moreover, these affirmative cases correspond to 120 unique 
six-digit HS products. Finally, countries which imposed AD duty on Brazilian 
exported products accounts for almost 50% of the Brazil’s total exports over the 
sample. This allows us to expect a dramatic impact of AD duties imposed by these 
countries on the trade flows of Brazilian firms to third countries. Table 1 
documents the products subject to AD duties and the duty imposing countries 
between 1994 and 2000.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: firms only deflect exports 
to countries where they have an already established trading relationship.  In 
particular, we find that, on the intensive margin, firms increase their export to 
alternative countries in which they were already exporting the targeted product 
when they suffer an AD duty in a particular export destination. On the extensive 
                                                          
6 See Prusa (2001). 
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margin, our findings suggest that firms’ probability of exporting the duty imposed 
product to a different market increases only if they have already an established 
trading relationship in that market. In contrast, we find no significant effect of AD 
duties on the firms’ probability of exporting the particular product in different 
export destinations that the firm did not serve before. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
describes the data; section 3 discusses the motivation of our empirical strategy and 
the formal econometric methodology. In section 4, we document the results. 
Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. DATA  
Export data comes from the Brazilian customs office SECEX (Secretaria de 
Comércio Exterior ) which documents exports by product code at the plant, month 
and NCM (Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul ) level. The NCM codes are 8-digit 
numbers, of which the first six digits coincide with the first six digits in the 
Harmonized System. The destination information is mapped from Brazilian 
country codes into the international ISO system. The product codes at the 6-digit 
level in the Brazilian data, for which there exists no corresponding Harmonized 
System entries, are removed from the data. All export values in the SECEX data 
are reported in current U.S. dollars (USD), free on board (fob). We utilize 
observations for the years between 1994 and 2000.7 We aggregate monthly plant-
level export information to years and firms. Export sales are deflated to their 
August-1994 equivalents using the monthly U.S. consumer price index (from 
Global Financial Data).  
The employment and wage data of Brazilian firms are obtained from the 
collection of annual reports with individual information on workers and 
employees, which is called RAIS (Relacao Anual de Informacoes Sociais).  Similar to 
                                                          
7 The data is not available after 2000.  
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our treatment of the export data, we aggregate the monthly worker-plant 
information to years and firms.8   
Finally, the data on AD is obtained from Global Antidumping Database.9 This 
database provides detailed product level information on the AD petitions such as 
the initiation date, the decision date, the targeted country, and the final decision of 
the AD authority as well as the HS codes of the products subject to filings.  
3. THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION   
The Classification of firm-product combinations 
Participating in export markets requires sunk start-up costs in the form of 
establishing necessary networks, acquiring information about the official 
procedures and adapting products. This makes the current-period export supply 
dependent upon the previous exporting status, given the fact that firms are able to 
continue exporting without burdening the start-up costs if they already exported 
to a particular market before. 10  Das et al. (2001), for instance, provide an 
estimation of such costs using structural estimates for Colombian firms and 
suggest that these costs are quite substantial; on average as high as 400,000 dollars. 
Most models of international trade on firm heterogeneity assume that these entry 
costs to export market are constant and exogenous to the firm.11 More recently, 
utilizing Chilean firm-level data Alvarez et al. (2010) uncovers sizeable 
heterogeneity across destinations in the nature of entry into different markets for 
firm-product combinations. Their study points out that these costs are indeed, 
market and product-market specific.  
  We also build our empirical strategy on these start-up costs of exporting. 
Before proceeding, we demonstrate the basis of our classification in Figure 1. 
Suppose that country i impose an AD duty on Brazilian exporters of product X. 
                                                          
8 See Hirakawa, Muendler and Rauch (2010) for more information about SECEX and RAIS data. 
9  http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/ 
10 See Dixit (1989) and, Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Bernard and Jensen (2001).  
11 For example, Clerides et al. (1998) and Melitz (2003). 
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There are three types of firms at the time of duty imposition which are affected by 
this AD measure:  
 
 Type 1 firms, which were exporting product X to country i and 
non-exporter in country h.  
 Type 2 firms, which were exporting product X to country i but 
exporting another product to country h.   
 Type 3 firms, which were exporting product X both to i and h.  
 
In order to deflect its trade to country h, type 1 firm, which did not export to 
country h before, has to incur the market specific start-up costs such as learning 
the bureaucratic procedures of exporting to country h and product-market specific 
start-up costs such as adapting the particular product in country h. However, type 
2 firm does not have to incur the market specific start-up cost in a similar scenario, 
given the fact that it has already served country h before. When it comes to the 
type 3 firm, which has an ongoing trading relationship for good X in both 
countries, there is no need to pay any start-up cost. Intuitively, deflecting trade to 
its trading partner for the type 3 firm is as easy as a couple of more phone calls 
compared to the type 1 firm which has to undertake the cost of entering to a new 
country, contacting potential customers and establishing necessary distribution 
channels to sell its product. On the other hand, type 2 firm has a comparative 
advantage over type 1 firm in terms of market specific start-up costs such as 
learning the bureaucratic procedures to export to country h. 
In the light of this three country setting, we first determined the firms 
which were the target of an AD duty at least once in the sample. Second, we 
constructed a panel for the firm-product-country triplets where the countries are 
the top 40 export destinations of Brazil. Third, we created a dummy variable 
which takes on a value of 1 if there is an AD duty in force targeting the particular 
firm-product combination in a country other than the country of the unit 
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observation. 12  Finally, in order to identify the effect of previous trading 
relationships of the firms, we used three different dummies for the three types of 
past export status described above.13 More specifically, each AD duty imposed in 
an export market creates the three country case mentioned above for Brazil, the 
duty imposer country and the destination country of the unit observation.  
To better understand the construction of the data, a representative case is 
illustrated in Table 2. In 1996, Mexico imposed AD duty to Brazilian steel 
connectors’ exporters (HS6 Code: 730719). At the time of the duty imposition, a 
firm was exporting steel connectors to Mexico, Chile and USA and ferro-silico-
manganese to Canada and Chile. The AD dummy is unity for steel connectors in 
non-Mexican destinations to identify the effect of the imposed AD duty by 
Mexico. As shown, this firm was non-exporter in Argentina, exporter of steel 
connectors in Chile and exporter of another product in the USA in the previous 3 
years. Each firm-product-destination is unity only for one of the past export status 
dummy which captures the effect of belonging one of these categories on 
exporting. The interaction of the AD variable and the past export status, on the 
other hand, captures the effect of the Mexican AD duty for these different 
categories. 
Baseline Estimation 
 
We start our empirical exercise by estimating the following equation: 
 
               (     )         (        )    (     )    (   )                 (1) 
                                               
where f denotes a firm, p denotes a six-digit HS product, i denotes an export 
destination, t denotes time in years between 1994 and 2000. The variable 
(     )denotes the value of exports        ) is a binary indicator, equal to 1 if the 
particular firm-product combination is hit with an AD duty in an export 
                                                          
12Following BC (2007), this variable is not zero in the period in which the investigation for an 
affirmative AD case is begun because of the fact that the targeted exporters begin to respond to 
tentative duty imposition shortly after the date filing is announced. 
13 We used three-year definition to denote past exporting status positive. 
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destination except country i 14 . (   )  is a vector of firm characteristics. The 
magnitude of    can be interpreted as trade deflection resulting from the AD duty 
in country h.   
We assume that        comprises two components, a permanent firm-
product-country component and a transitory component. So the error term 
satisfies: 
                                                             (2)   
                                            
where               
   and                 are independent of each other.  Fixed 
effects (FE) estimator is one way of estimating equation (1) because it eliminates 
time invariant error component,        However, the greatest econometric concern 
in FE estimation of equation (1) is that it results in biased and inconsistent 
estimates associated with the serial correlation of   (       ) with FE transformed 
residuals. In order to remedy this autocorrelation, we first difference equation (1) 
and estimate it using the two stage least squares/instrumental variables (IV) 
approach described in Anderson and Hsiao (1982) in which we instrument for 
using the multiple lags of the levels of this variable.15,16  
 
  It should be emphasized that there are also two potential problems with the 
IV estimator used in estimating equation (2); bias due to the measurement error 
and bias associated with the use of a weak instrument. If there is measurement 
error in   (     ), then the measurement error in the variable,    (       ), will be 
correlated with the measurement error in the instrument,   (       )  Therefore, 
we employ an alternative instrument,    (       )   in consideration that its 
measurement error is not correlated with the measurement error in    (       ).17 
                                                          
14 This variable is non-zero for the consecutive years in which the duty is in effect. 
15 Note that direct estimation of the first difference of equation (1) by OLS also provides biased 
estimates because lagged difference of exports is correlated with the error term. 
16  Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable is important to control for the consideration that 
firms may ramp up exporting everywhere regardless of the AD action.  
17See BC (2007) for the same argument.  
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In addition, to test the quality of the instrument, we estimate the first-stage model 
using our instrument. We find that our instruments are strong and conclude that 
IV approach is appropriate for our estimation.18  
 
Control Variables 
 
Exporters are found to be more productive than non-exporters.19 In line 
with this, a change in exporter firm’s productivity over time might affect the total 
value of its shipments. Therefore, our policy interactions might capture the effect 
of a productivity shock at the firm level that would be correlated with the growth 
in exports. The customs data does not allow us to control for productivity because 
it contains no information on domestic sales. However, we control for the size of 
the firms which is measured by the total number of workers employed within a 
year. It is believed that larger firms tend to be more productive and have higher 
expected profits from exporting. Moreover, as discussed in Bernard and Jensen 
(2004), size may control for several factors; larger firms have lower average and 
marginal costs which improve exporting activity and also size is a proxy for past 
success by definition. 
 The growth in exports can also partially be explained by macroeconomic 
factors in the destination market. For instance, trade openness, GDP growth and 
exchange rate appreciation in a potential export market can work as an import 
demand shifter which would help exporters deflect their shipments to that 
destination. In this regard, we use country-year dummies to control for 
macroeconomic aggregates.  
  
 Introducing the role of previous exporting relationships 
 
 The first column in Table 2 documents the estimates for equation (1). 
Although the policy variable,(      ), has the expected sign, it is not statistically 
                                                          
18 While we do not report the results of the instrument tests, the first stage estimations are available 
from the author upon request. 
19 See Greenway and Kneller (2007) for a survey of this literature. 
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significant. In order to examine whether the previous trading relationships of the 
firms for the targeted products provides a different outcome in terms of trade 
deflection, we continue with estimating the following equations: 
  
  (     )         (        )    (     )         (     )      (   )        
                                                         (3) 
                  (       )    (     )              (        )  
  (        )    (   )+                                                                                       (4) 
 
 where    is a dummy and unity if the firm in the unit observation was 
exporting the targeted product to both country i and h before the duty imposition.  
The equation (4) models the probability of exporting in an export market 
when an AD duty imposed in a different market (extensive margin).           is a 
binary variable that equals 1 if the firm exports product p to country i in time t and 
zero otherwise.    takes on a value of 1 if the firm was non-exporter in country i 
and    is equal to 1 if the firm did not export product p but exported another 
product to country i before the duty imposition.  
 The most important issue in estimation (4) is the influence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. There might be some permanent firm or product attributes; or 
managerial skills which are correlated with the decision to start exporting a 
particular product as a result of an AD duty imposed in another destination. This 
will yield us to overestimate the effect of our policy interactions as these variations 
are not observed. There are different alternatives to estimate the binary choice 
model of starting to export a product with unobserved elements including 
maximum likelihood techniques such as probit or conditional logit, or linear 
probability model with random or fixed effects. For the reason that unobserved 
heterogeneity is correlated with our firm specific controls, random effect 
estimation is not appropriate for our specification. As a result, to model the 
unobserved heterogeneity as fixed, we choose to work with linear probability 
model.  
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In addition, it is highly likely that unobserved characteristics in our model 
are serially correlated with   (       ) . Therefore, we follow a methodology 
similar to our earlier estimation to correct for autocorrelation and instrument for  
  (       ) using its second lag. Given the potential correlation of FE transformed 
residuals with the lagged export value, we also estimate our model using IV first 
differences in order to avoid the problem of inconsistent estimates found in the 
fixed effects model. 
 
4. RESULTS  
 
 The results derived from estimating equation (3) are shown in the second 
column of Table 2. As opposed to the first specification, the effect of AD duty is 
significant when it is interacted with the past exporting status (type 3). This 
suggests that firms begin to increase their shipments to alternative countries that 
they were already exporting the same product when they suffer an AD duty in a 
particular export destination (intensive margin). In terms of the economic 
interpretation, imposition of a trade restriction in the form of an AD duty on a six-
digit HS product results in a 13% increase in the Brazilian firms’ exports of the 
targeted product to alternative countries where the firms previously exported the 
same product.20   
 The third column of Table 2 documents the results for the extensive margin 
estimation. Similarly, the past exporting statuses of the firms are interacted with 
the policy variable. As shown, although the interaction of AD duty variable is 
significant for type 2, the policy variable itself and the type 1 interaction term is 
insignificant. This suggests that imposition of an AD duty in a particular 
destination increases the firms’ probability of exporting the targeted product in a 
different destination if the firm already served the market before. On the contrary, 
we do not observe such a probability increase to the export destinations that firms 
                                                          
20 To better quantify the magnitude of trade deflection, we use the formula in Kennedy (1981) to 
convert the coefficient of the dummy variable to its true marginal effect. 
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did not export before. In terms of the magnitude of the effect, imposition of an AD 
duty in a particular destination increases the probability of exporting in a different 
destination by 11 for the destinations that the firm exported another product 
before.         
 In conclusion to the extensive margin estimation, the insignificant 
coefficient of type 1 interaction demonstrate that market specific start-up costs of 
exporting plays a crucial role in determining the potential export market to deflect 
trade for the firms whose product suffer an AD duty in a particular destination. 
This might also be related to the temporary feature of the AD duties. It would be 
plausible for a targeted firm to deflect its trade to a country they never exported 
before as a result of a permanent change in a particular country’s trade policy. 
However, the cost of the temporary adjustment in trade policy in the form of an 
AD duty in an export market does not seem enough to dominate the market 
specific start-up costs in another destination; although it seems to offset the 
market-product specific start-up costs.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Trade deflection has become an important issue in the WTO and other 
Customs Unions’ framework. From China specific safeguards to intra-regional 
trade protocols, there are many examples of policy debates regarding this issue.21 
This paper represents the first attempt to utilize a rich four dimensional customs 
data of firms, products and export destinations to analyze the effect of past 
exporting relationships on trade deflection resulting from AD duties which targets 
Brazilian exported products. Our key finding is that firms only deflect exports to 
countries where they have an already established trading relationship. In 
particular, we find that, on the intensive margin, firms increase their export by to 
alternative countries in which they were already exporting the targeted product 
when they suffer an AD duty in a particular export destination. On the extensive 
                                                          
21 WTO section 16.8 allows a WTO member to impose a “China safeguard” on a product imported 
from China if the same product has already been targeted by another WTO member. 
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margin, our findings suggest that firms’ probability of exporting the duty imposed 
product to a different market increases only if they have already an established 
trading relationship in that market. In contrast, we find no significant effect of AD 
duties on the firms’ probability of exporting the particular product in different 
export destinations that the firm did not export before. In addition to making 
sense of existing puzzles in trade deflection,  this  paper  makes  an  important  
contribution  by  demonstrating  how  much  the  fixed costs  of  developing  an  
export  destination  matter in terms of trade deflection. 
Our paper also paves the way for a more detailed exploration of trade 
deflection using the firm level data in order to better understand the trading 
effects of AD policy not only for the duty imposer and the targeted country but 
also for the third party countries which are not named in the investigation. In 
addition, we also point out a new view to examine the relationship between trade 
deflection and the spread of worldwide AD filings. We believe that researchers 
and policy makers should focus more on exporting firms’ past trading 
relationships when evaluating the threat of trade deflection in the World trading 
system. For instance, Feinberg and Reynolds (2006, 2007) and Moore and Zanardi 
(2008) speculate that the spread of AD filings may partially be explained by trade 
deflection.22 As noted earlier, when exports are deflected to third party countries, 
these third countries might also subsequently request more import protection in 
the form of AD duties. To capture this possible explanation, they use a variable 
which is equal to the number of global AD cases filed the previous year in the 
particular industry category. Although their estimates are significant, this variable 
does not capture the true effect of trade deflection due to the aggregation. It is not 
typical for a country to impose a restriction on a product because of a surge in 
imports in another product within the same industry. Second, this measure does 
not provide any clue about the destinations that exports should deflect to. For 
                                                          
22 We should note that the effect of trade deflection on the spread of AD filings is not the actual 
research question, whereas, it is a control variable in both papers. 
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instance, a high number of AD duties imposed on steel products in North America 
against Mexico does not guarantee either trade deflection for all Mexican firms or 
trade deflection to all countries. As a matter of fact, it is less likely to observe a 
reaction from a country, which has a small import share of steel from North 
America, to a steel war in the region.  
Our study also raises concerns to the WTO’s China safeguard which allows 
members to deviate from MFN rule based on the threat of trade deflection. As 
more disaggregated firm-level data of exports become available, we believe that 
researchers should focus on the trading relationships of firms in different 
countries when they evaluate the threat of trade deflection and its effect on the rise 
of protectionist policies.   
Another related question regarding our paper is whether the targeted firms 
switch exported products in the duty imposer country when they deflect their 
trade to different destinations or whether the imposition of an AD duty in a 
country affects the firms’ exports of another product, rather than the targeted one, 
because of trade deflection. While our focus in this paper is the effect of past 
trading relationships on trade deflection, analyzing the trading effects of AD in 
terms of these related topics is an attractive avenue for future research. 
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 Case Imposing country Product Year 
1 USA Stainless Steel Wire Rod 1994 
2 USA Ferrosilicon 1994 
3 USA Silicomanganese 1994 
4 USA Stainless Steel Bar 1994 
5 Australia A4 Cut Ream Copy Paper 1994 
6 Australia Fibreglass Gun Rovings 1994 
7 Canada Corrosion Resistant Steel Sheet 1994 
8 European Union Pig Iron (Hematite) 1994 
9 India Bisphenol-A 1994 
10 Mexico Specialty Steel Products 1994 
11 European Union Ferro-Silico Manganese 1995 
12 Mexico Hot-Rolled Steel 1995 
13 Mexico Steel Sheets 1995 
14 Mexico Cold-Rolled Steel 1995 
15 Mexico Steel Plates In Rolls 1995 
16 Mexico Corrugated Iron Sheets 1995 
17 Mexico Butyl Rubber 1995 
18 USA Pressure Pipe 1995 
19 Mexico Steel Connectors 1996 
20 Peru Calcium Carbide 1997 
21 Argentina Chain Saws 1997 
22 Argentina Ceramic Magnets 1997 
23 Argentina Fuses 1997 
24 South Africa Suspension PVC 1997 
25 Argentina Gas Carafe 1998 
26 Argentina Fiber Optic Cables 1998 
27 European Union Monosodium Glutamate 1998 
28 South Africa Uncoated wood-free paper 1998 
29 Argentina Chains 1999 
30 Argentina Abrasives 1999 
31 Argentina Flat Laminated Products 1999 
32 South Africa Cut paper (A4) 1999 
33 Argentina Eviscerated Chicken 2000 
34 Argentina Javelins 2000 
35 Argentina Denim 2000 
36 Argentina Steel Sheets 2000 
37 Canada Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate 2000 
38 Canada Stainless Steel Round Bar 2000 
39 Turkey Fittings 2000 
40 European Union Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings 2000 
TABLE 1: ANTIDUMPING DUTIES IMPOSED ON BRAZILIAN EXPORTERS  
1994-2000 
Source: Bown (2010) 
Table 2. Example of data 
Firm Product Destination Year AD 
dummy 
Type 
1 
Type 
2 
Type 
3 
101 Steel connectors 
(HS6:730719) 
Argentina 1996 1 1 0 0 
101 Steel connectors 
(HS6:730719 
Chile 1996 1 0 1 0 
101 Steel connectors 
(HS6:730719) 
USA 1996 1 0 0 1 
101 Ferro-silico-manganese 
(HS6:720230) 
Canada 1996 0 0 0 1 
101 Ferro-silico-manganese 
(HS6:720230) 
Chile 1996 0 0 0 1 
 
Notes: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is an export market, t is a year. 
Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote variables statistically 
significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. All specifications include  a constant term 
which is suppressed. 
  
Table 3. Estimation Results 
 
  
 
 
 
        Intensive Margin 
IV first dif. 
 
(1)                     (2) 
Extensive Margin 
  IV first dif.  
 
     (3)                                       
AD duty 0.073 0.062 0.014 
 (0.26) (0.86) (0.63) 
AD duty*type1    0.054 
   (0.77) 
AD duty*type2   0.113 
   (12.38)*** 
AD duty*type3  0.132  
  (8.32)***  
Type1   -0.013 
   (1.01) 
Type2   0.156 
   (1.67)* 
Type3  0.192  
  (10.53)***  
ln(expfpit-1) 0.154 0.166  
 (19.22)*** (18.43)***  
ln(empft) 0.089 0.082 0.069 
 (15.76)*** (22.67)*** (10.14)*** 
Country-year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.17 0.21 0.18 
Observations 18657 18657 173040 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Global Antidumping Database, SECEX and RAIS. Notes: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is 
an export market,t is a year. φ denotes the summary statistics only for the unit observations with positive 
export values.  
 
 
Table A1. SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation Observations 
∆ln(expfpit)φ 6.534 3.869 18657 
EXPfpit 0.312 0.967 173040 
(ADduty)fpht 0.416 0.553 173040 
(ADduty)fpht* Type1 0.182 0.370 173040 
(ADduty)fpht * Type2 0.109 0.267 173040 
(ADduty)fpht * Type3 0.125 0.289 173040 
∆ln(employment)ft -0.031 0.654 173040 
